

1 Introduction

1.1 Topics

Rough outline of the first part:

1. Secret sharing
2. Distributed/threshold cryptosystems
3. Asynchronous Byzantine agreement using randomization and using eventual synchrony
4. Atomic broadcast (Byzantine-fault tolerance, BFT)
5. BFT services and storage
6. Proactive cryptosystems
7. Untrusted storage

The second part of the course will be a seminar-style interactive presentation of classic research papers and recently developed systems by the participants.

1.2 Distributed storage tolerating Byzantine faults

1.2.1 Definitions

Byzantine quorum system. Quorum systems are a fundamental concept for synchronizing access to replicated data. Quorum systems usually address systems where servers are subject to crash failures.

Consider a set of n servers $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$, of which up to f may deviate arbitrarily from their specification, i.e., a system of n servers with f Byzantine faults. A *Byzantine quorum system* for \mathcal{P} is a set of subsets of \mathcal{P} such that every two subsets intersect in at least one non-faulty server. Every such set is called a *[Byzantine] quorum* [MR98].

The canonical example of a Byzantine quorum system treats all servers uniformly and is based on a majority: its quorums are all sets $Q \subset \mathcal{P}$ such that $|Q| = \lceil \frac{n+f+1}{2} \rceil$.

Abstract storage. A *read/write register* is a simple and useful abstraction for shared data storage. Registers were formalized by Lamport [Lam86] in the so-called *shared-memory model*, where multiple processes access data objects concurrently and asynchronously [AW04]. We use the register abstraction to define the interaction of multiple clients with a storage device connected to clients over a network.

Definition 1 (Register). A register r is accessed by two operations:

$write(r, x) \rightarrow \text{OK}$: writes a value x to register r and returns the symbol OK;

$read(r) \rightarrow x$: reads the register r and returns its value x .

A register is characterized along three dimensions:

1. the domain of values that it stores;
2. the number of processes that may write to or read from it; and
3. its behavior under concurrent access.

We consider here only one register; it has arbitrary domain (equivalently, its domain is the set of strings) and it can be accessed by a single writer process and by many reader processes, a so-called *SWMR register*.

We now address the behavior of registers under concurrent access. Every process executes at any time only one operation. An operation is *invoked* at some point in time and *returns* at a later point in time. When a write operation with value x returns OK, we say that it *writes* x .

The *sequential specification* of a register requires that each read operation returns the value written by the most recent preceding write operation.

For two operations o_1 and o_2 , we say that:

- o_1 *precedes* o_2 whenever o_1 returns before o_2 is invoked (they are *sequential*), and
- o_1 *is concurrent with* o_2 when neither operation precedes the other one.

Lamport [Lam86] has introduced the following three semantics of a register under concurrent access. W.l.o.g. assume there is an initial *write* operation that writes \perp .

Safe: A register is *safe* when every *read* not concurrent with a *write* returns the most recently *written* value. *Reads* that are concurrent with at least one *write* may return any value in the domain.

Regular: A register is *regular* if it is *safe* and any *read* concurrent with a *write* returns either the most recently *written* value or a *concurrently written* value.

Atomic: A register is *atomic* whenever the *read* and *write* operations are *linearizable* [HW90], which means that there exists an *equivalent* totally ordered *sequential* execution of them. In other words, there exists a permutation π of all invocations and responses in the execution such that the sequential specification of every register holds and such that for any two operations o_1 and o_2 where o_1 precedes o_2 in the execution, o_1 also precedes o_2 in π .

(For one writer only, a simpler definition is to require that the register is *regular* and ensures that if an operation r_1 returns a value written by w_1 , an operation r_2 returns a value written by w_2 , and r_1 precedes r_2 , then w_2 does not precede w_1 .)

1.2.2 Distributed implementation of regular storage

Suppose there are a writer process C_w and multiple reader processes C_1, C_2, \dots ; they are collectively called *clients*. A register accessed by the clients can be implemented in a *fault-tolerant* way on a distributed system, consisting of n storage *servers* or *replicas*, P_1, \dots, P_n . Up to f servers may fail by behaving in arbitrary ways (Byzantine faults). We assume that clients do not fail.

The servers communicate with the reader and writer processes by sending messages over an asynchronous network. The network provides a reliable and authenticated point-to-point FIFO channel between every client and every server. The servers do not communicate with each other.

We present a protocol that emulates a register to the reader and to the writer processes, despite the failure of some servers. For tolerating faults, the value in the register is stored collectively by all servers. A wait-free protocol here means that clients complete all operations independently from server failures and independently of the speed of other clients.

The writer may use a digital signature scheme to sign messages, which uses two operations, *sign* and *verify*. The first operation can only be run by the writer C_w ; calling $sign_w(m)$ with $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ returns a signature $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*$. The second operation can be run by all clients; $verify_w(m, \sigma)$ takes $m, \sigma \in \{0, 1\}^*$ as inputs and returns a Boolean value $b \in \{\text{FALSE}, \text{TRUE}\}$ such that $verify_w(m, \sigma) = \text{TRUE}$ if and only if σ was returned to C_w by $sign_w(m)$ before.

Algorithm 2 (Distributed implementation of a SWMR regular register [MR98]).

Algorithm for the clients. The writer C_w stores a timestamp t .

```

write(x):                                     // writer  $C_w$  only
   $t \leftarrow t + 1$ 
   $\sigma \leftarrow sign_w(t || x)$ 
  send message (WRITE,  $t, x, \sigma$ ) to  $P_1, \dots, P_n$ 
  wait for a message (ACK) from  $\lceil \frac{n+f+1}{2} \rceil$  servers
  return OK

read():                                       // client  $C_j$ 
  send message (READ) to  $P_1, \dots, P_n$ 
  wait for messages (VALUE,  $t_i, x_i, \sigma_i$ ) such that  $verify(t_i || x_i, \sigma_i) = \text{TRUE}$ 
  from  $\lceil \frac{n+f+1}{2} \rceil$  servers
  let  $x$  be the value  $x_i$  received in the message with the largest timestamp  $t_i$ 
  return  $x$ 

```

Algorithm for the servers. Every server P_i stores a tuple (t_i, x_i, σ_i) .

```

upon receiving message (WRITE,  $t, x, \sigma$ ) from  $C_w$ :           // server  $P_i$ 
  if  $t > t_i$  then
     $(t_i, x_i, \sigma_i) \leftarrow (t, x, \sigma)$ 
    send message (ACK) to  $C_w$ 

upon receiving message (READ) from  $C_j$ :                         // server  $P_i$ 
  send (VALUE,  $t_i, x_i, \sigma_i$ ) to  $C_j$ 

```

Theorem 3. *Assuming at most $f < n/3$ faulty servers, Algorithm 2 implements a SWMR regular register.*

Proof sketch. The *read* and the *write* operations each access a Byzantine quorum of servers. Hence, after a *write* operation terminates, every server in some Byzantine quorum stores the value and the highest timestamp so far. If no other *write* starts, then at least one server in the Byzantine quorum accessed by the reader will send the written value with the highest timestamp so far in its VALUE message to the reader, and the *read* returns the most recently written value. If another *write* operation is concurrent to the *read*, the unforgeability of digital signatures implies that the reader returns either the most recently written value or the concurrently written value. □

References

- [AW04] H. Attiya and J. Welch, *Distributed computing: Fundamentals, simulations and advanced topics*, second ed., Wiley, 2004.
- [HW90] M. P. Herlihy and J. M. Wing, *Linearizability: A correctness condition for concurrent objects*, ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems **12** (1990), no. 3, 463–492.
- [Lam86] L. Lamport, *On interprocess communication*, Distributed Computing **1** (1986), no. 2, 77–85, 86–101.
- [MR98] D. Malkhi and M. K. Reiter, *Byzantine quorum systems*, Distributed Computing **11** (1998), no. 4, 203–213.