

Tutorial Part – I

Introduction to Robust Machine-Learning

Principles of Distributed Learning

Rafael Pinot & Nirupam Gupta – Oct. 13 2023



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Based on a joint works with



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Rachid Guerraoui



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John Stephan

SUB-PART 1. Some Reminders on Distributed Machine Learning


- 1.1 Reminders on supervised machine learning
- 1.2 Distributed/federated machine learning
- 1.3 Motivations for trustworthy machine learning

SUB-PART 2. Robustness to Byzantine Nodes (in Homogeneity)

- 2.1 Brittleness of vanilla methods
- 2.2 First step towards robustness: aggregation rules
- 2.3 More advanced tools: noise reduction


Reminders on Distributed Learning

Supervised Learning (Example of Image Classification)




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


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 - 1) Define a loss function $\ell : \mathbb{R} \times \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ and a hypothesis class \mathcal{H}
 - 2) Find $h \in \mathcal{H}$ to minimize the expected error $\mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}} [\ell(h(x), y)]$




- Given a set of m **training examples**:

$$\mathcal{S} := \{(x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_m, y_m)\} \sim \mathcal{D}^m$$

- Parameterized class $\mathcal{H} := \{h_\theta \mid \theta \in \mathbb{R}^d\}$
- Minimize the **empirical risk**:

$$\mathcal{L}(\theta) := \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^m \ell(h_\theta(x_i), y_i)$$



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
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Learning objective: Assuming \mathcal{L} admits a minimum on \mathbb{R}^d , we seek an ε -approximate solution to the empirical risk minimization (ERM), i.e., $\hat{\theta}$ such that


$$\mathcal{L}(\hat{\theta}) - \mathcal{L}^* \leq \varepsilon, \text{ where } \mathcal{L}^* = \min_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d} \mathcal{L}(\theta).$$

Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) in the Centralized Setting



- **Simple** and **efficient** method
- Well understood theoretically
- **Massively used** in practice (especially for deep learning tasks)


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- Start with an arbitrary parameter θ_1
- At every step $t = 1, \dots, T$ do:
 - Sample a data point $(x, y) \sim \text{Unif}(\mathcal{S})$
 - Compute a stochastic gradient $g_t := \nabla_{\theta_t} \ell(y, h_{\theta_t}(x))$
 - Update the parameter $\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \gamma g_t$

Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) in the Centralized Setting



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Notebook result [Bottou et al. \(2018\)](#): After T iterations of the SGD algorithm, set $\hat{\theta} := \theta_{T+1}$. Then, **under reasonable assumptions**, $\hat{\theta}$ is an ε -approximate solution to the ERM, with


$$\varepsilon \in \mathcal{O} \left(\frac{\phi(\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{S})}{T} \right)$$

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Intuitively, **the more data the better:**

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Even more in **modern day ML** with demanding tasks (e.g. vision or speech)

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- Train a model on a single massive dataset
- Distribution **limits computations/storage**



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2. Cross-silo distributed/federated learning

- Datacenters are **geo-distributed** by design
- Keeping data locally is safer

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
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3. Cross-device distributed/federated learning

- Same reason for distribution / security requirement
- **Less computational power** per device
- More diversity in the data (**heterogeneity**)




Distributed Machine Learning: Problem Statement



- Server-based communications n computing nodes and a (trusted) central server
- The **nodes** hold the data locally $(\mathcal{S}_i)_{i \in [n]}$

$$\mathcal{L}_i(\theta) := \frac{1}{m} \sum_{(x,y) \in \mathcal{S}_i} \ell(h_\theta(x), y)$$

- The **server** **coordinates** the learning



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
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


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- $\exists \mu > 0$ such that for all $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d$, we have


$$\|\nabla \mathcal{L}(\theta)\|^2 \geq 2\mu (\mathcal{L}(\theta) - \mathcal{L}^*) \quad (\text{Polyak's inequality})$$

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→ Numerical examples neural-network for image classification

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- All local datasets have the same size m (everything can be adapted)
 - We make this assumption, just for simplicity
- **Homogeneity** of the datasets, i.e., $\mathcal{S}_i = \mathcal{S}_j$, for all $i, j \in [n]$
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Bounded stochasticity: There exists $\sigma \geq 0$ such that for all $i \in [n]$ and $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d$,

$$\frac{1}{m} \sum_{(x,y) \in \mathcal{S}_i} \|\nabla \ell(h_\theta(x), y) - \nabla \mathcal{L}_i(\theta)\|^2 \leq \sigma^2$$

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
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→ Every time I sample a point at random in \mathcal{S}_i the gradient estimate has a bounded expected $\|\cdot\|^2$ to the real gradient

Distributed Stochastic Gradient Descent (DSGD)



Initialize the model at θ_1 , then at every step $t = 1, \dots, T$

- **node** i computes & sends


$$g_t^{(i)} = \nabla_{\theta_t} \ell(y_i, h_{\theta_t}(x_i)),$$

where $(x_i, y_i) \sim \mathcal{S}_i$.

- **Server** updates & broadcast

$$\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \gamma \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n g_t^{(i)}$$

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Textbook result [Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis \(2015\)](#):

Set $\hat{\theta} := \theta_{T+1}$. Then $\hat{\theta}$ is an ε -approximate solution to the ERM, with

$$\varepsilon \in \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{L}}\sigma^2}{nT}\right), \text{ and } \mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{L}} := \frac{L}{\mu}.$$

Machine learning models are everywhere

- Machine learning models recently gave **outstanding results** (*e.g.* vision, NLP)
- Industries and governments are starting to use them in **critical applications**

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

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
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AI-driven Technologies



Decision-making Tools




Personal Devices



But great power comes great responsibility ...

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- Massive use of learning algorithms raises **societal** and technical issues
- **Since the 80's:** privacy preserving database analysis is a primary concern
- Some more recent and specific to Federated Learning (**Byzantine failures**)

Robustness to Byzantine Nodes

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
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Challenge: We do not know a priori which nodes may misbehave (nor how)


The Byzantine Threat Model



- We consider the **Byzantine threat model** inherited from [Lamport et al. \(1982\)](#)
- Up to $f < n/2$ nodes may be bad
- When i is Byzantine we have

$$g_t^{(i)} = *, \forall t \in [T]$$

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
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New objective: Denote H the set of honest (non-Byzantine) nodes. We seek an ε -approximate solution to the ERM for the loss function defined as

$$\mathcal{L}_H(\theta) := \frac{1}{n-f} \sum_{i \in H} \mathcal{L}_i(\theta) \quad (\text{a.k.a. } (f, \varepsilon)\text{-Byzantine resilience})$$

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
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→ **Despite the f Byzantine players (and not knowing H a priori)**

Is DSGD Byzantine Robust?




Recall update rule at the server:

$$\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \gamma \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n g_t^{(i)}$$

The average is arbitrarily manipulable by a **single** Byzantine node.

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A standard approach to confer Byzantine robustness:

Replace the simple averaging with a **non-linear** aggregation rule $F : \mathbb{R}^{d \times n} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^d$:


$$\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \gamma F(g_t^{(1)}, \dots, g_t^{(n)})$$

→ Choosing F is close to the **robust mean estimation** problem

Why is Choosing F a Challenging Problem?

One of the main challenges is uncertainty:

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\left\| \mathbf{g}_t^{(i)} - \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbf{g}_t^{(i)} \right] \right\|^2 \right] \leq \sigma^2$$



Small σ



Big σ

● Range of plausible gradients for an honest worker


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Range of plausible gradients for an honest worker



Small σ



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Essentially: the bigger σ , the harder it is to defend against Byzantine nodes

If $\sigma^2 = 0$ (i.e., gradient descent)

→ **F = Majority voting.**

When $\sigma^2 > 0$ (i.e., SGD)

→ **F = ?**

Some Famous Aggregation Rules 1/2

Simple coordinate-wise solutions ($n = 5, f = 1, d = 2$):

Coordinate-wise median (CW-Med)

→ Compute the median on each coordinates.

$$\text{CW-Med} \begin{pmatrix} 3 & 1 & 3 & 6 & 8 \\ 6 & 2 & 4 & 3 & 1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 3 \\ 3 \end{pmatrix}$$

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Coordinate-wise trimmed mean (CW-TM)

→ Remove f biggest and f smallest coordinates on each dimension, and then average.

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Both these solutions have been analyzed, e.g., in [Yin et al. \(2018\)](#).

More sophisticated aggregations:

Geometric median [Chen et al. \(2017\)](#)

→ Output a vector that realizes the geometric median of the send gradients, i.e.,

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But also **MeaMed** [Xie et al. \(2018\)](#), **Krum, Multi-Krum** [Blanchard et al. \(2017\)](#) ...

Common notion of (f, κ) -robust averaging:

For any set of n vectors $v_1, \dots, v_n \in \mathbb{R}^d$ and any subset $S \subseteq [n]$ of size $n - f$,

$$\|F(v_1, \dots, v_n) - \bar{v}_S\|^2 \leq \frac{\kappa}{n - f} \sum_{i \in S} \|v_i - \bar{v}_S\|^2,$$

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Quick sanity check: If $\sigma^2 = 0$ the honest workers are identical (full gradients)

$$\sum_{i \in S} \|v_i - \bar{v}_S\|^2 = 0$$

→ The aggregation rule should mimic the majority voting scheme.

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Agg.	CW-TM	GM	CW-Med	L.B.
κ	$\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{f}{n-2f}\right)$	$\mathcal{O}\left(1 + \frac{f}{n-2f}\right)$	$\mathcal{O}\left(1 + \frac{f}{n-2f}\right)$	$\Omega\left(\frac{f}{n-2f}\right)$

Applies to **Krum**, **Multi-Krum** [Blanchard et al. \(2017\)](#) and **MeaMed** [Xie et al. \(2018\)](#).

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
Convergence result in the homogeneous case:

If F is an (f, κ) -robust averaging, setting $\hat{\theta} := \theta_{T+1}$, the algorithm satisfies (f, ε) -Byzantine resilience with

$$\varepsilon \in \mathcal{O} \left(\frac{\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{L}_H} \sigma^2}{(n-f)T} + \kappa \sigma^2 \right)$$

Some Numerical Observations: Model Setting

Learning task: MNIST hand-written digit image classification task with $n = 15$ nodes out of which $f = 5$ might be Byzantine.



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



Adversarial behaviors: The Byzantine nodes apply either of the following:

- *Label-flipping:* shift the label of each image **0123456789** \rightarrow **1234567890**
- *Sign-flipping:* send the inverse of the local gradient $\mathbf{g}_t^{(i)} \rightarrow -\mathbf{g}_t^{(i)}$

Some Numerical Observations: The Results


Training accuracy of a CNN along the learning procedure on MNIST. On the **left** label-flipping attack and on the **right** sign-flipping attack.



Why is There Still a Gap?

Recall the challenge of uncertainty:

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\left\| \mathbf{g}_t^{(i)} - \mathbb{E} \left[\mathbf{g}_t^{(i)} \right] \right\|^2 \right] \leq \sigma^2$$



Small σ



Big σ



Range of plausible gradients for an honest worker

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
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Range of plausible gradients for an honest worker


Main idea: Let us get the uncertainty smaller to obtain better convergence!

Option 1: Use mini-batch SGD



Option 2: Use distributed momentum

Option 1: Mini-batch SGD & Dynamic Sampling



→ **Each honest worker i**

- Samples a batch of b_t points

$$B_t^{(i)} = \{(x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_{b_t}, y_{b_t})\}$$


- Computes and send

$$g_t^{(i)} = \frac{1}{b_t} \sum_{(x,y) \in B_t^{(i)}} \nabla \ell(h_{\theta_t}(x), y)$$

→ **Server updates & broadcasts**

$$\theta_{t+1} = \theta_t - \gamma F(g_t^{(1)}, \dots, g_t^{(n)})$$

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
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Pros and cons of the method:

- Reduces the noise at every step $\sigma^2 \rightarrow \frac{\sigma^2}{b_t}$
- Need large b_t to work which inflates the computational cost of the method

Controlling Uncertainty Drift with Momentum



- **Honest node i** computes


$$m_t^{(i)} = \beta m_{t-1}^{(i)} + (1 - \beta) g_t^{(i)},$$

where $m_0^{(i)} = 0$ and $\beta \in [0, 1)$.

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Pros and cons of the method:

- Initially introduced to accelerate the learning when $\sigma^2 = 0$, see [Polyak \(1964\)](#)
- Can also be used to **control uncertainty** when $\sigma^2 > 0$
- Way harder to analyze (**momentum drift vs noise reduction**)

Option 2: Controlling Uncertainty with Momentum

Key ingredient of the analysis: In short, we have that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\left\| m_t^{(i)} - \bar{m}_t \right\|^2 \right] \in \mathcal{O} \left(\sigma^2 (1 - \beta) \right), \text{ where } \bar{m}_t := \frac{1}{(n - f)} \sum_{i \in H} m_t^{(i)}.$$

Then choosing the right momentum coefficient β (essentially) yields the result

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

→ Eluding quite some technicalities (especially on the momentum drift)

Convergence result in the homogeneous case [Farhadkhani et al. \(2022, 2023\)](#):

Assumes F is an (f, κ) -robust averaging and β is chosen “well-enough”. Then setting $\hat{\theta} := \theta_{T+1}$, the algorithm satisfies (f, ε) -Byzantine resilience with



$$\varepsilon \in \mathcal{O} \left(\left(\kappa + \frac{1}{(n - f)} \right) \frac{\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{L}_H} \sigma^2}{T} \right)$$

Impact of the Momentum on Byzantine Resilience





Same setting as before. **Up** without momentum ($\beta = 0$)

Impact of the Momentum on Byzantine Resilience



Same setting as before. **Up** without momentum ($\beta = 0$) and **down** with momentum ($\beta = 0.99$)



Take-home messages

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Future directions:

- Understand the impact of data heterogeneity in (robust) federated learning
- How to combine robustness with other concerns (**privacy**, fairness, bias, etc.)

→ **Nirupam's talk**

Thanks for listening!

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